NEWSLETTER 17 OCT 2026 *WHAT'S NEW IN THE COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WORLD?*

Comparative Administrative Law Scholarship Corner

Affiliation with the Yale Comparative Administrative Law Listserv

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Can Responsible Government Survive in Australia?

Australia Senate

Abstract by IA:

This chapter, from Can Responsible Government Survive in Australia?, published by the Australian Senate, examines how parliaments control delegated legislation: regulations, ordinances, statutory instruments and similar rules made by the executive under authority conferred by statute. Delegation is unavoidable given the volume and technical complexity of modern regulation, and in Australia roughly four regulations are issued for every act passed. Left unchecked, however, it becomes a fertile field for executive and bureaucratic overreach, and judicial review offers only a limited, slow and costly remedy. The author first sets out the features of an "ideal legislature." All delegated instruments must be tabled on pain of invalidity, and each house must be able to disallow them independently within a fixed period. A disallowed instrument cannot be promptly remade, a safeguard prompted by the 1930–32 dispute in which one regulation was remade twelve times. Henry VIII clauses and sub-delegation are tightly restricted. A non-partisan scrutiny committee with independent legal advice examines instruments, and the legislature ensures accessibility, explanatory memoranda and sunset clauses.
Measured against this standard, practice in the United Kingdom, Canada and its provinces, Australia and its states, and New Zealand ranges from reasonable to deplorable. In the United Kingdom the scrutiny committees have narrow terms of reference and the government can deny debate. Federal control in Canada is weak and confined to the House of Commons, and most provinces have effectively abandoned the field. The Australian Senate offers the most effective model: its Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances, established in 1932, works by consensus and negotiates with ministers with the credible threat of disallowance behind it. The Australian states and New Zealand have improved, particularly in reviewing and repealing obsolete instruments. The chapter concludes that effective control depends on a chamber not dominated by the government and on a genuine willingness to disallow.

Not in my (Constitutional) Backyard: How Not to Speed Up Planning Challenges

UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, Oct 8, 2026

Bell, Joanna
Hooper, Hayley J

Important issues of UK constitutional law can arise in the most unusual of places. Some of the most important cases on undergraduate reading lists, for example, concerned disputes about fishing licences and whether goods could be measured in imperial, rather than metric, units. In this blog we draw attention to a proposal which, if enacted, would be of enormous constitutional significance. Yet it is located in a place many public lawyers would not think to look.
In May 2026 the Treasury published a policy paper entitled Getting Britain Building Again. The subtitle of the paper is 'Reforming Judicial Review for Infrastructure'. It proposes the creation of a constitutionally novel 'parliamentary authorisation mechanism' which would confer on development consent orders ('DCOs') a legal status 'akin to an Act of Parliament.' Here, we introduce the proposal and its background. We then go on to explain why, if enacted, it would give rise to important and contentious issues of constitutional law.

From Judicial Regulation to Judicial Governance: Locating the Courts on the Map of Social Ordering

Regulation & Governance 1–14, 2026.

Coendet, Thomas

Courts have long been recognized as venues of social control and policymaking. The rise of regulatory capitalism suggests reconsidering the judiciary in regulatory terms, notably through work that casts courts as regulators. This article argues, however, that styling courts as regulators is both analytically and normatively deficient: it obscures the distinctive function of courts and their contribution to social ordering. At the same time, judicial decision-making plainly exhibits a regulatory dimension. Yet rather than stretching the concept of regulation, this article proposes to capture this dimension through governance theory. On this theoretical foundation, the article outlines a model of judicial governance that elucidates how social ordering emerges from adjudication and how it unfolds over time. In particular, the model highlights the implications of judicial decision-making for private ordering and draws attention to processes of intermediation through lawyers, media, and advanced digital technologies. It thus opens a set of analytically structured research questions and complements them with a methodological framework to orient future work on judicial governance.

Artificial Intelligence, Regulatory Capacity, and the Adaptive State

Regulation & Governance 1–16, 2026.

Doyle, Chris
Cave, Martin
Webb, William

Artificial intelligence is changing not only what regulators govern but the informational environment through which regulation is conducted. Regulators increasingly use advanced analytics to process evidence and target supervisory attention, while regulated organizations deploy AI across their operations. This paper develops the concept of the adaptive regulatory state to analyze how changing informational capabilities generate behavioral and institutional adaptation. Comparative cases from financial supervision, competition, tax administration, and electronic communications identify three possible trajectories: constructive learning, governed co-evolution, and adversarial escalation. Effective oversight does not require technological parity with regulated firms, but sufficient informational, organizational, and verification capabilities to respond as the regulatory environment changes. Four institutional principles follow: functional rather than technological capacity; effective inspectability and proportionate assurance; learning with bounded revisability; and coordinated but accountable capacity. The adaptive regulatory state is defined by whether regulatory institutions remain capable, accountable, and legitimate as their informational environment evolves.

Regulatory Reliance and the Politics of Pharmaceutical Governance

Am J Public Health. 2026;116(11):1712–1718.

Fonseca, Elize Massard da

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has long served as a credibility reference for dozens of countries that incorporate its assessments into their own drug authorization processes. I argue that regulatory reliance is a governance mechanism through which the reputational capital of a few anchor agencies shapes pharmaceutical regulation worldwide. For reliance to work, anchor agencies must maintain credibility and independence sufficient to make their assessments worth borrowing, and domestic regulators need enough autonomy to invoke external assessments as constraints on domestic political pressure.
Drawing on Carpenter's reputational concept, the political economy literature on regulatory agency design, and evidence from Latin America, the Asia-Pacific, and Africa, my analysis documents the architecture of reliance and its concentration in a few agencies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Brazil's regulator grounded its emergency procedures in FDA and European Medicines Agency standards to resist domestic pressure, whereas India's regulator authorized vaccines before any reference authority had acted. Workforce reductions, compressed timelines, and weakened evidentiary standards at the FDA now threaten this architecture. Countries that had no part in this erosion are likely to bear its consequences.

Contested Coexistence: Transnational Private Governance and Public Regulatory Reform in Global Value Chains

Regulation & Governance 1–15, 2026.

Jerrentrup, Pauline
Kosché, Jade

This article examines how a transnational coalition of NGOs, unions, and labor rights organizations drove both private and public regulation on gender-based violence and harassment in Lesotho's garment sector, and how the resulting regulatory systems coexist despite ongoing tension between them. Drawing on 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork, stakeholder interviews, and archival analysis, we show that the coalition leveraged reputational and diplomatic pressures, enabled by Lesotho's structural dependence on the United States as both buyer and donor, to secure the Lesotho Agreement and subsequent public regulatory reforms. The same dependencies that enabled these reforms also generated sustained tensions once the regulatory systems were in place. We term this dynamic contested coexistence—a governance configuration in which a supplying country's structural dependence on a buyer country forecloses rejection of a private regulatory system while constraining open endorsement of it—and identify it as a new form of private-public interaction within Cashore et al.'s framework.

Public Enemy: New USDA Rule Eviscerates Public Participation under NEPA

Written: Apr 10, Posted in SSRN: Oct 7, 2026

Johnson, Richard

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has been called America's environmental charter, and for over 50 years has helped the American public understand, comment on, and sometimes even influence federal agency decisions affecting the environment. However, it has received sustained criticism from conservatives who argue the law has adversely affected the economy without any corresponding environmental benefit, and recently the "abundance agenda" left has joined this chorus. The Trump administration recently repealed long-standing regulations governing public participation under NEPA and replaced them with a series of agency-specific rules. This paper examines one set of the new agency-specific NEPA regulations, those issued by the United States Department of Agriculture, which govern the environmental analysis actions of several agencies within the department, including the United States Forest Service. It discusses NEPA's origins, the evolution of public participation under the law, and argues that Agriculture's new rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act by severely curtailing public participation without considering the effects of these changes on the public.

From Public to Private Governance, and Back—Eco-Modulation as De-Privatization in Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)

Regulation & Governance 1–15, 2026.

Kalimo, Harri
Jukka, Antti
Lifset, Reid
Kautto, Petrus

The European Union is advancing circular economy policies, aimed at reducing the environmental impacts of products across their life-cycles. Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) exemplifies this strategy. It privatizes the end-of-life management of products to their producers, seeking thereby to incentivize the producer to design environmentally more sustainable products. However, EPR has failed to deliver significant improvements in product design. This article examines the EU's attempts to strengthen eco-design in EPR through 'eco-modulation'. Applying the theory of competence-and-control, the article argues that the introduction of eco-modulation will destabilize the public-private balance in EPR, shifting EPR back from private towards public governance. This de-privatization is expected to refine EPR's role within the EU's policy mix. Our findings thus offer insights for the development of EPR-related circular economy policies, while also contributing to theories of privatization.

Regulatory Learning or Regulatory Privilege? How Sandbox Design Shapes the Governance Value of Experimental Regulation

Regulation & Governance 1–13, 2026.

Kálmán, János

Regulatory sandboxes are controlled, time-limited environments in which selected innovations are tested under regulatory supervision. This article asks how sandbox design can make selective experimentation capable of generating public regulatory value rather than regulatory privilege. It develops regulatory learning asymmetry to distinguish private, supervisory, and public regulatory learning and unequal distributions of access, information, learning, and benefits. A structured reading of public documents from five deliberately diverse FinTech and artificial intelligence cases illustrates a six-element operational framework. The case material is not used to infer private or supervisory learning; it records only publication, generalization mechanisms, and documented uptake. The framework identifies a public-learning configuration, a supervisory-learning configuration that public documents cannot verify, and a regulatory-privilege risk configuration. Market signaling is treated as a cross-cutting dynamic. The article offers a bounded diagnostic for assessing whether case-specific experience becomes contestable and institutionally usable knowledge.

Independent Agencies, Regulation-Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU

Regulation & Governance 1–18, 2026.

Leidorf-Tidå, B., S.
Alon-Barkat, M. Busuioc
T. de Boer

The effectiveness of regulatory policy in many areas is contingent on citizens adhering to the scientific advice of regulatory bodies. This in turn depends on whether they perceive this advice as credible. One of the biggest threats to regulatory credibility is the concern that regulatory policy can be tainted by short-term political interests. Consequently, regulation literature points to agency independence as a crucial resource to securing regulatory credibility, which in turn fosters citizen compliance. We test this assumption both observationally and experimentally in the case of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) risk assessment for the first COVID-19 vaccine—a prime example of reliance on credibility in regulation under conditions of controversy and concerns over political interference. We conducted a pre-registered survey experiment with 4000 EU citizens from four countries timed shortly after the vaccine's approval and before its mass distribution. The results provide partial support that independence is beneficial to regulatory credibility and by extension, to regulatory compliance. Citizens who perceive the EMA as more independent found its risk assessment to be more credible and were more willing to take the vaccine. However, our experimental evidence is less conclusive. Thus, while independence might not in and of itself be a "silver bullet" to ensure regulatory credibility and compliance, it does play an important role, and its real-life substantive significance would scale up considerably at population levels.

Interpretive Dependence after Loper Bright: Arvin, County of King, and Downstream Governmental Risk

Written: Aug 27, Posted in SSRN: Aug 29, 2026

Manko, Oksana

Loper Bright is usually discussed as a decision about the allocation of interpretive authority between courts and agencies. This Essay focuses instead on a downstream problem: what happens when state and local governments have already organized programs, budgets, permits, or legal obligations around a federal statutory premise they do not control. Using two August 2026 Ninth Circuit decisions—Committee for a Better Arvin v. U.S. EPA and County of King v. Turner—the Essay develops the concept of "interpretive dependence." It identifies two distinct mechanisms through which that dependence can arise. Regulatory incorporation occurs when a federal statutory interpretation becomes embedded in a cooperative-federalism program before judicial correction. Subsequent federal conditioning occurs when state or local commitments precede a later federal assertion of statutory authority to impose new grant conditions.
The Essay argues that these mechanisms expose a dimension of post-Loper Bright risk that conventional court-agency analysis can miss. It also proposes a source-tracing inquiry for identifying the legal status of the federal premise, the path through which it entered a state or local program, and the commitments that depend on it.

Legal Clarity and the Rule of Law: A Global Experimental Study of Consistency in Administrative Decision-Making

Regulation & Governance 1–8, 2026.

Nilsson, Joakim
Nistotskaya, Marina

Laws often contain linguistically complex features that increase cognitive processing demands and weaken comprehension. We extend this argument to bureaucratic decision-making by proposing that reduced legal clarity decreases the consistency of administrative decisions. We test this argument using an online survey experiment with nearly 900 current and former government officials from 33 countries, who were randomly assigned to adjudicate a real administrative case under either a less-clear or clearer legal text. The case, which involves a building permit application, provides a realistic and broadly comparable context for examining how legal clarity shapes consistency in administrative decision-making. Exposure to reduced legal clarity significantly decreased the consistency in law application and increased the likelihood of legally incorrect decisions. There is no evidence that reduced legal clarity systematically steers decision-makers toward a single dominant error category.

Constitutional law, neoliberalism, and the state: The reinvention of administrative justice in 1980s France

International Journal of Constitutional Law, moag101, 05 Oct, 2026.

Perroud, Thomas

This article revisits the 1987 decision of the French Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) that conferred constitutional status on the jurisdiction of the administrative courts, framing it not as a straightforward defense of legal tradition but as a strategic response to neoliberal reforms. Drawing on previously unexamined archival materials from the Conseil d'État and the Conseil constitutionnel, it reconstructs the legal and political struggles surrounding the creation of a new competition authority and the decision to entrust judicial review of its actions to the civil rather than the administrative courts. Although the decision appeared to resist neoliberal reforms, it in fact reveals how the Conseil d'État successfully repurposed constitutional law to preserve its institutional authority amid growing criticism of the administrative state. The case illustrates how constitutional principles in France may emerge not from textual mandates or enduring legal doctrine but from tactical institutional positioning. It also sheds light on why France has experienced a more ambivalent form of neoliberalization, with state institutions such as the Conseil d'État adapting and even expanding their influence in the face of market-driven reforms.

When is the Best Reading of A Statute that it Delegates Discretion?

Posted in SSRN: Aug 27, 2026

Petrovic, Marko
Tobia, Kevin
Walters, Daniel E.

The Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo to end Chevron deference has at least temporarily unsettled the field of administrative law and cast administrative agencies' place in government into serious doubt. But does Loper Bright really portend a "revolution" in administrative law, or will it augur a "marginal" reframing of familiar principles? Much will turn on the significance of sixteen words, in which the Court states that "often," the best reading a statute is that it authorizes an agency to exercise a degree of discretion. Given several of the justices' commitment to a brand of textualism that centers "ordinary" readers of statutes, the likely doctrinal path forward is that the Court will analyze whether a hypothetical reasonably informed reader would understand statutory language in context to delegate a degree of discretion. We illuminate this path with a series of large empirical studies of over 5,000 lay American readers. We test the Court's proposed framework—that discretion can be communicated by (1) express statements to define terms, (2) express statements to "fill in details", and (3) the inclusion of open-ended or flexible terms. The study has important implications for how sweeping of a change Loper Bright initiated, and it provides potential baselines for the future elaboration of delegations by lower courts and guidance for Congress in designing delegations that will comply with Loper Bright. More generally, our analysis highlights the importance of the ordinary meaning of delegation in the Loper Bright framework, contrasting with competing candidates that do not comport with the textualist paradigm.

Economic Governance and Institutional Design

Regulation & Governance 1–17, 2026

Prüfer, Jens

How should institutions be designed to achieve compliance with behavioral rules, including laws, social norms, religious rules, or cultural traditions? This conceptual paper introduces a typology of economic governance institutions and explains how it can be used both by policy makers, administrators, and researchers in all social sciences to improve rule compliance. It explains how effective and efficient institutions can be identified for a given economic governance problem. The framework is built on the microeconomic foundations of economic governance theory, and its applicability extends to any compliance problem that can be formalized as a social dilemma or coordination game. The concepts are applied to two cases: how to create trust in cloud computing technologies, and how to implement data sharing of user-generated information on data-driven markets.

Agency for Food Security in Brazil: Social Mobilization, Participation and Public Policy

Publisher: Toronto Metropolitan University Libraries; September 30, 2026; ISBN: 978-1-77417-114-1

Rocha, Cecília
Moraes, Andrea

Agency, through social participation in policy making and implementation, is a core pillar of Brazilian democracy. Robust democratic frameworks and public participation are essential for defending the right to food and effective food security. The book describes how agency for food security is operationalized, restricted, and reclaimed across different scales.

Decoding State Statutes

Written: Aug 18, Posted in SSRN: Aug 27, 2026

Street, Leslie
Dingledy, Frederick W

Judges prefer to analyze statutes with a seemingly simple proposition at its heart: if you want to know what the law is, you just need to read the text of the statute. Textualism is the preferred tool for statutory analysis among judges. This principle is one of the pillars that support the idea that the United States is a nation governed by the rule of law; we cannot claim to be ruled by law if the people cannot know what those laws are. Knowing what the "text of the statute" is, however, can be complicated. Today, when a lawyer or judge wants to read a statute, they usually look at the code. After all, that is what the Bluebook tells people to do. In many states, however, the binding text of legislation is found in the enrolled bills, not the code. The language that state governments use to describe their statutes adds to the confusion, making it difficult to identify which version of their statutes has the binding text. Some states will designate a code as "official", even though the enrolled bills have the final say in what the law means in that jurisdiction.
This article discusses the need for states to clarify their statutes and statutory publications. We offer several reasons why the need to clear up statutory publication ambiguity and make official versions of statutes universally available to the public is more urgent than ever. The article also offers several recommendations for how states can better serve legal practice and the orderly development of law by improving statutory publication.

Struggling to Say Something New About Deference

Administrative Law Blog Org, Oct 13, 2026

Tamir, Oren

I am fortunate enough to co-edit, with Janina Boughey and Lisa Burton Crawford, The Cambridge Handbook of Comparative Statutory Interpretation in the Global Common Law World. This massive Handbook will be out with Cambridge University Press late next year, with 27 chapters surveying statutory interpretation across the common law world from both the Global North and the Global South. The Handbook also takes up a series of "hot topics" that matter for statutory interpretation in virtually every common law jurisdiction, including the concept of "legislative intent," the role of "context," the rise of empirical methods to decide interpretive questions, the way courts should incorporate the function of legislative drafters into interpretation, AI and its interaction with statutory construction, and much more.
As things developed, I was slotted to write the chapter for the Handbook on the topic of deference. And to be absolutely honest, I was struggling at first with what to do. The reason is that while comparative work on how statutes are interpreted around the world is strikingly thin (which is a major premise of our Handbook), the question of who gets to interpret statutes has been done to death from a comparative perspective (including previously by yours truly, and in a co-edited Balkinization symposium with Susan Rose-Ackerman). The focal point for the global discussion was always the American Chevron doctrine, and the fact that the rest of the world found it bizarre. And now the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright, which overruled Chevron, didn't kill the debate. It rekindled it.
I struggled a bit, but, in the end, I'd like to think that I managed to say something useful about this very familiar terrain. Here's the gist of The Stakes and Architecture of Deference.

The Stakes and Architecture of Deference

Janina Boughey, Lisa Burton Crawford & Oren Tamir (eds), The Handbook of Comparative Statutory Interpretation in the Global Common Law World (CUP 2027), Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 26-19.

Tamir, Oren

Against the backdrop of a glaring neglect of serious scholarly treatment of statutory interpretation from a comparative perspective, the subject of deference—the question of who interprets statutes—is an exception. The rise and 2024 fall of Chevron deference in the United States fascinated observers in jurisdictions that formally reject deference, and a lively comparative literature has followed. This chapter asks two questions: what are the stakes of deference? And what doctrinal architecture should it take? The chapter distinguishes first between deference's instrumental stakes (expertise, democracy, judicial depoliticization, uniformity, speed, candor, and guidance) from ideational ones (judicial humility, respect for the administrative state, and a realist/functionalist understanding of law). It then shows that each of these stakes often rests on contested premises whose weight varies across jurisdictions and domains, or at least has a shadow side. Despite this complexity, the chapter defends a global blueprint for thinking about deference. First, I argue deference deserves recognition in every mature constitutional democracy with an administrative state, though recognizing it is distinct from choosing its level. Second, the presumptive default should be not Chevron deference but rather "deference as respect," as developed most sophisticatedly in Canada. Third, jurisdictions may legitimately dial deference up or down when local stakes justify it. Along the way, the chapter identifies an American paradox: the United States has the strongest instrumental case for deference, yet a legal culture increasingly unreceptive to its best form. And it highlights as well how the question of deference, and how much it is needed or not, is importantly connected to a country's chosen methodology of statutory interpretation.

Administrative Justice in the United Kingdom

Bloomsbury Publishing, Oct 01, 2026; ISBN: 9781509983810

Thomas, Robert

This book critically examines the development and operation of administrative justice in the UK.
Every day, people have millions of interactions with government and public services. Administrative justice is concerned with the fairness of these interactions and the redress mechanisms people can use when things go wrong. Administrative justice is a large and expanding part of the legal system and of governmental activity in the United Kingdom. It includes initial administrative decision-making, the delivery of public services as well as redress and scrutiny mechanisms, principally tribunals, complainthandling and ombudsmen. Administrative justice encompasses a far greater number of decisions than the caseloads of the courts.
This book explores what administrative justice is, why it is important, how it has evolved, how it works in practice and how it could be improved. Combining theoretical and empirical analysis, the book examines various contexts in which administrative justice operates, including benefits and special educational needs and disability. It also examines the social and political forces that drive the development of administrative justice and critically analyses the creation, operation and effectiveness of redress institutions.

Transnational Business Regulation: An Analysis of Extraterritorial Regulatory Capacity

Published October 7, 2026 by Routledge; ISBN 9781041274520

Venturini, Otavio

This book examines how domestic laws project influence beyond national borders, analyzing why certain regulations and enforcement agencies achieve disproportionate global reach, reshaping foreign legal frameworks and compelling international corporate compliance.

Departing from traditional international law's focus on abstract jurisdictional principles, this book examines extraterritoriality through concrete regulatory regimes, particularly the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). These regimes exemplify transnational business regulation as a hybrid legal framework, combining administrative and criminal law tools to transcend national boundaries. The text also brings a Global South perspective, grounded in Brazil's firsthand experience with the extraterritorial application of U.S. and European laws. Through comparative case studies of high-profile enforcement actions in Brazil, the book reveals how powerful jurisdictions can reshape legal orders in the Global South, and how the ideal of equitable sovereignty and multilateral solutions under international law has been increasingly challenged by extraterritorial regulatory practices.

This book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of business law, international law, transnational law, and the sociology of law.

U.S. Artificial Intelligence Regulation During the Biden Administration

U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 26-22; Journal of Law & Economic Regulation, Vol. 17, p.7, 2024

Yoo, Christopher S.
Mueller, Alex

The past four years have seen a notable evolution in the United States' approach to regulating artificial intelligence (AI). Under the leadership of President Joseph Biden, the U.S. federal government has demonstrated a much greater willingness to address risks of harm posed by AI systems proactively. Yet in so doing, it has remained committed to fostering an environment conducive to innovation, continuing to show a preference for voluntary self-regulatory measures and sector-specific oversight rather than heavy handed interventions.

This article examines the major regulatory developments that have taken place during the Biden administration, including those at the federal level - such as the recent landmark Executive Order on AI, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework, and actions by specific agencies - as well as the flurry of legislative activity occurring at the state level. While questions remain about the long-term trajectory of AI regulation in the U.S., a clear governance framework has taken shape over the past four years that reflects a deliberate effort to balance safeguarding of public and national interests with the goals of promoting technological advancement and economic competitiveness.

Events and Informations:

- **2026 ABA Administrative Law Fall Virtual Conference:** American Bar Association – Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice: **December 3-4, 2026 | Virtual – for more information, click here**
- **Call for Presenters & Commentators:** New Voices in Administrative Law (The AALS Section on Administrative Law): **Friday, Jan. 8, from 11:10am-12:25pm - for more information click here**
- **22nd General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (IACL) Berlin – for more information, click here**
- **Call for papers:** Special Issue Administrative Law and Governance in Contemporary States **– for more information, click here (Deadline: May 30, 2027)**
- **Call for papers:** Duke Law Journal 57th Annual Administrative Law Symposium **February 26, 2027,** at Duke University School of Law, North Carolina **– for more information, click here**
- **Soft Law Summit - Accelerating Industry Self-Regulation: November 17, 2026,** at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C **– for more information, click here**

Please contact the editor at his e-mail with your comments, information, questions or suggestions for our Comparative Administrative Law listserv.
